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SOCIAL JUSTICE, GENOMIC JUSTICE
AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE:
HARSANYI MEETS MENDEL
SAMIR OKASHA
University of Bristol, UK
samir.okasha@bristol.ac.uk
John Harsanyi and John Rawls both used the veil of ignorance thought
experiment to study the problem of choosing between alternative social
arrangements. With his ‘impartial observer theorem’, Harsanyi tried to
show that the veil of ignorance argument leads inevitably to utilitarianism,
an argument criticized by Sen, Weymark and others. A quite different use
of the veil-of-ignorance concept is found in evolutionary biology. In the cell-
division process called meiosis, in which sexually reproducing organisms
produce gametes, the chromosome number is halved; when meiosis is
fair, each gene has only a fifty percent chance of making it into any
gamete. This creates a Mendelian veil of ignorance, which has the effect
of aligning the interests of all the genes in an organism. This paper shows
how Harsanyi’s version of the veil-of-ignorance argument can shed light on
Mendelian genetics. There turns out to be an intriguing biological analogue
of the impartial observer theorem that is immune from the Sen/Weymark
objections to Harsanyi’s original.
1. INTRODUCTION
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) invoked the device of an ‘original
position’ to study the problem of social justice. He imagined someone
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forced to choose between alternative social arrangements from behind a
‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. without knowing which member of society she will
become. Rawls maintained, controversially, that the rational agent would
choose the social alternative which maximized the prospects of the least
well-off member of society - the maximin principle.
As is well known, Rawls was not the first to use a veil of ignorance
argument to think about social justice. In two famous papers, Harsanyi
(1953, 1955) imagined a ‘sympathetic, impartial observer’, again tasked
with choosing between social alternatives from behind a veil; a still earlier
version of the idea was sketched by Vickrey (1945). By contrast with
Rawls, Harsanyi argued that the veil-of-ignorance thought experiment
leads inevitably to utilitarianism, an argument that has come to be called
the ‘impartial observer theorem’. Harsanyi arrived at this conclusion by
assuming that the impartial observer has an equal chance of becoming any
individual, and chooses between social alternatives in accordance with
expected utility maximization.
Most recent commentators regard Harsanyi’s treatment of the veil
of ignorance as superior to Rawls, given Rawls’s largely unmotivated
rejection of orthodox decision theory. But even so, controversy surrounds
the impartial observer theorem. A number of authors, notably Sen (1976,
1977, 1986), Weymark (1991), Roemer (1998) and Mongin (2001), have
argued that Harsanyi’s theorem does not constitute a good argument for
classical utilitarianism, for reasons explained below. There is a large and
well-known literature on this issue.
What is much less well-known is that the veil-of-ignorance concept
has also surfaced in evolutionary biology, in a context quite remote
from the traditional Rawls/Harsanyi debate. During meiosis – the cell-
division process by which sexually reproducing organisms make gametes
– the chromosome number is halved: only one of each chromosome
pair is passed to each gamete. Most of the time meiosis is ‘fair’, so that
any particular gene has a 50% chance of making it into any gamete –
a fact known as Mendel’s law of segregation. The law has profound
evolutionary consequences, as it equalizes the interests of all the genes
in the organism, ensuring they work for the common good; see section 5.
Indeed fair meiosis, or Mendelian segregation, is arguably a prerequisite
for the very existence of cohesive organisms such as ourselves.
That fair meiosis serves to equalize genes’ interests was first
emphasized by Leigh (1971), and is now an accepted biological principle.
But it is only recently that the intriguing analogy between fair meiosis and
the veil of ignorance has come to light. In both, randomization is used
to deprive self-interested agents (genes and individuals) of information
about their identity, forcing them to adopt an impartial perspective.
This analogy is noted in passing by the biologists Haig and Bergstrom
(1995) and Frank (2003), who cite both Rawls and Harsanyi, but the only
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extended discussion of which I am aware is in a semi-popular book by
Mark Ridley (2000), who mentions only Rawls.1
The aim of this paper is to consider in detail whether the traditional
veil-of-ignorance concept can be used to understand Mendelian genetics.
Can the Harsanyi/Rawls thought experiment shed light on the actual
process of fair meiosis? I suggest that it can, and in particular that there is
an interesting biological analogue of the impartial observer theorem. This
may sound like a rather unlikely project, so it is worth briefly explaining
the motivation for it, which is three-fold.
Firstly, there are many interesting parallels between economics and
evolutionary biology, arising because the concept of utility in the former
plays a similar role to the concept of fitness in the latter. The importing
of game-theoretic concepts into biology is the best known illustration of
this role-isomorphism, but is not the only one. The current project also
trades on the utility/fitness connection, and is in part an attempt to better
understand the elusive relation between these two concepts.
Secondly, there is plenty still to say about how the veil-of-ignorance
idea applies to genetics. Ridley’s discussion, though illuminating, is
compromised by his considering only Rawls’s version of the veil of
ignorance. Since Harsanyi arguably had the more coherent version, his
is the better place to look for a link with Mendelian genetics. Additionally,
Ridley’s treatment contains a subtle confusion between proximate and
ultimate explanations, as I argue below, and ends up locating the link in
the wrong place.
Thirdly, my project fits naturally with a philosophically exciting way
of thinking about Darwinian evolution, which treats genes as if they were
rational agents trying to maximize a utility function. This approach, aptly
dubbed the ‘heuristic of personification’ by Sober (1998), permeates mod-
ern evolutionary thinking and is of undoubted value for some purposes.
But doubts over its legitimacy have often been raised.2 By modelling genes
as individuals behind a veil of ignorance, I hope to illustrate both the
power and the limitations of the personification heuristic.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 expounds
Harsanyi’s version of the veil-of-ignorance argument. Section 3 outlines
the now-standard objections to the argument due to Sen (1986) and
1 Skyrms (1996) discusses what he calls the ‘Darwinian veil of ignorance’ in his work on
the evolution of the social contract, but his use of this notion is unrelated to the one
explored here, as it has nothing in particular to do with Mendelian genetics. The same
is true of Binmore’s (2006) attempt to locate the Rawls/Harsanyi ‘original position’ in an
evolutionary context.
2 Personifying genes as an aid to evolutionary reasoning was employed extensively by
Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976), though the roots of the idea are found in W.D.
Hamilton’s papers from the 1960s (1964). Haig (1997) presents a sophisticated defence of
the heuristic, and Godfrey-Smith (2009) a sophisticated critique.
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Weymark (1991). Section 4 provides some biological background on
Mendelian genetics. Section 5 considers the evolutionary function of fair
meiosis, and its implications. Section 6 explores two different ways of
modelling fair meiosis in Harsanyi’s framework. Section 7 examines paral-
lels, conceptual and formal, between Harsanyi’s impartial observer argu-
ment and our evolutionary analogue. It is argued that the Sen/Weymark
critique of Harsanyi’s argument does not apply to the evolutionary ana-
logue. Section 8 compares my analysis with Ridley’s. Section 9 concludes.
2. HARSANYI’S IMPARTIAL OBSERVER ARGUMENT
Harsanyi’s own formulation of the impartial observer argument is rather
elliptical, so I draw on the careful reconstructions by Weymark (1991) and
Mongin (2001). The context is a standard social choice setting. There is a
finite set of social alternatives S, which could for example be alternative
distributions of resources among society’s members. There is a finite set
of individuals I . Each individual has a (weak) preference order over
the alternatives in S. The preference order of the i th individual will be
denoted Ri ; so ‘xRi y’ means that the i th individual weakly prefers social
alternative x to y.
Harsanyi assumes further that each individual has a preference order
over the set of lotteries whose prizes are the members of S, i.e. the set of
probability distributions over S, denoted S. These lotteries will be called
simple lotteries (to be contrasted with the extended lotteries below). Thus
for example if S = {x, y, z} then one simple lottery is < P(x) = 14 , P(y) =
1
2 , P(z) = 14 >. Obviously, any alternative x in S can be identified with the
simple lottery that gives x probability 1 of occurring. The point of consid-
ering preferences over lotteries is to license the introduction of cardinal
utility. Each individual’s preferences over S are assumed to satisfy the
von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) axioms, hence can be represented by
an expectational utility function unique up to affine transformation.
Harsanyi then imagines a hypothetical ‘impartial observer’ who is
sympathetic to the interests of the members of society, and is able to
imagine himself in the role of any member. The observer can evaluate
‘extended alternatives’ of the form ‘being individual 2 in social alternative
x’. An extended alternative is thus an ordered pair of an individual and a
social alternative; the set of all extended alternatives is I × S. The observer
is assumed to have a preference order over this set; thus he can make
judgements such as ‘I would prefer to be individual 2 in alternative x than
individual 3 in alternative y’.
Harsanyi next considers the set of lotteries over the extended alterna-
tives, or the ‘extended lotteries’3, denoted (I × S). He assumes that the
3 This terminology comes from Weymark (1991).
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impartial observer has a preference order over the extended lotteries that
satisfies the expected utility axioms, so is representable by a vNM utility
function. We let Ro denote the observer’s preference order over (I ×
S), and let uo denote a particular vNM utility representation of Ro .
One subset of the extended lotteries is of particular significance: the
impartial extended lotteries in which the observer has an equal chance
of becoming any member of society.4 Thus if there are n individuals in
set I , the lottery < P(x, i) = 1n for all i > is the impartial extended lottery
in which social alternative x definitely occurs and the observer has an
equal chance of becoming any individual. (The corresponding simple
lottery is < P(x) = 1 >, i.e. alternative x for certain.) Harsanyi assumes
that the probability that the observer becomes any given individual
is independent of the probability that any particular social alternative
occurs. This means that for every simple lottery there is a unique impartial
extended lottery that corresponds to it, i.e. which yields the same marginal
probabilities for the social alternatives as the simple lottery.
A simple example may help illustrate. Suppose there are two social
alternatives x and y, and two individuals. So S = {x, y}, and I = {1, 2}.
There are four extended alternatives: {(1, x), (1, y), (2, x), (2, y)}. Consider
the simple lottery L1 in which x occurs with probability 2/3 and y with
1/3, i.e. L1 = < P(x) = 23 , P(y) = 13 >. The impartial extended lottery
E1 that corresponds to L1 is then: < P(1, x) = 13 , P(1, y) = 16 , P(2, x) =
1
3 , P(2, y) = 16 >. Note that E1 gives the observer equal chances of
becoming either person, and gives alternatives x and y the same
probability of occurrence as does L1. Also, E1 makes the probability that
the observer is a given person independent of the probability that a given
social alternative occurs.
Since the impartial observer is sympathetic to the interests of society’s
members, Harsanyi proposes a link between the preferences of the
observer when he is imagining himself to be a given individual, and
the preferences of that individual himself. The observer’s ordering of
extended lotteries in which he is definitely individual i should coincide
with individual i ’s ordering of the corresponding simple lotteries. This
is Harsanyi’s principle of acceptance. The underlying idea is that each
individual’s personal preferences are sovereign, so when the observer
imagines himself in the shoes of a given individual he thereby imagines
himself to have that individual’s personal preferences.
From the observer’s preference ordering over the impartial extended
lotteries, Harsanyi then derives a social preference over the simple
lotteries, and thus over the social alternatives themselves. He simply
4 Giving the observer an equal chance of becoming any individual is Harsanyi’s way of
modelling the observer’s epistemic position from behind the veil of ignorance. Harsanyi is
invoking the classical principle of indifference at this juncture, as Mongin (2001) notes.
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postulates that society’s preference between simple lotteries derives from
the observer’s preference between the corresponding impartial extended
lotteries. Consider two simple lotteries L1 and L2 and the corresponding
impartial lotteries E1 and E2. Harsanyi says that L1 is socially preferable
to L2 if and only if the impartial observer would prefer E1 to E2. Since any
social alternative is itself a (degenerate) simple lottery, this yields a way of
ordering the social alternatives.
Clearly, Harsanyi’s extraction of a social preference from the
observer’s extended preferences rests on an ethical judgement. Harsanyi
thinks that society should choose between alternatives (or lotteries)
according to how a sympathetic observer, with an equal chance of
becoming any individual, would choose between them. Intuitively this
captures our concept of social justice quite well, but its ethical standing
could obviously be questioned.
The ingredients are now in place for Harsanyi to derive his utilitarian
conclusion. Suppose R is the social preference order on the simple
lotteries, defined via the observer’s extended preference order Ro . Since
Ro satisfies the vNM axioms, so does R. Thus R can be represented by
a vNM utility function u, which we may call the ‘social utility function’.
Harsanyi then shows that the social utility function can be expressed as
the average of all the individual’s utility functions. So society follows an
average utilitarian rule: it ranks simple lotteries (and thus alternatives)
according to the average utility that they bring to members of society. This
is the impartial observer theorem.
More precisely, what Harsanyi shows is this. There exist individual
vNM utility functions u1, ...,un, one for each member of society,
which represent the individuals’ preference orders R1, . . . , Rn; and the
social utility function u which is the average of these n individual
utility functions, i.e. u(x) = 1n
∑
ui (x) for all x ∈ S, represents the social
preference order R, when R is defined via the observer’s extended
preference Ro on the corresponding impartial lotteries.5
How do we find the particular individual utility functions for which
this is true? They are implicitly defined by the particular choice of
vNM utility function uo to represent the observer’s extended preference
ordering. Suppose that y ∈ (I x S) is an extended lottery in which the
observer is individual i for certain. Let x be the corresponding simple
lottery. Then set ui (x) = uo(y), i.e. individual i ’s utility for the simple
lottery x equals the observer’s utility for the extended lottery y.6 Relative
to the individual utility functions u1, ...,un defined this way, the social
utility function u is given by the average utilitarian rule.
5 This is a verbal paraphrase of theorem 9 in Weymark (1991).
6 Since the principle of acceptance is satisfied, the function ui defined by this procedure
represents individual i ’s preference order.
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To summarize, Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem tries to derive
a utilitarian conclusion from three ingredients. These are: (i) the
assumption that all individuals, including the observer, are expected
utility maximizers; (ii) the principle of acceptance; and (iii) the ethical
postulate that society’s choice should be determined by what the impartial
observer would choose from behind the veil. The difference between
Harsanyi and Rawls stems chiefly from the latter’s rejection of (i).
3. THE SEN/WEYMARK CRITIQUE OF HARSANYI
Though formally straightforward, the philosophical significance of the
impartial observer theorem is a matter of ongoing controversy; see
Mongin (2001) for a recent assessment. Sen (1986) argued that Harsanyi’s
theorem does not in fact establish a utilitarian conclusion, in the ordinary
sense of utilitarianism, but is merely a representation theorem for social
preferences. This criticism was endorsed and further developed by
Weymark (1991).
The essence of the Sen/Weymark critique is that there is an
irreconcilable tension in Harsanyi’s argument. On the one hand he needs
to assume that utility is fully interpersonally comparable, i.e. both utility
levels and differences can be compared across individuals. (Difference
comparability is needed for utilitarianism to be a well-defined doctrine,
and level comparability is needed for the impartial observer to be able
to make his judgements of extended preference.) On the other hand he
assumes that ‘utility’ means utility in the sense of von Neumann and
Morgenstern, i.e. a numerical representation of a preference relation over
lotteries. Preferences are primary, on the standard vNM picture, and
utility derived.
This is inherently problematic. One problem is that the vNM theory
does not itself tell us how to make the required interpersonal comparisons;
but there is a deeper problem. As Weymark stresses, if utility is merely
a representation of preference, there is no particular reason to restrict
attention to vNM utility functions (i.e. ones that are linear in the
probabilities, or expectational). The vNM theorem tells us that if an
individual’s preference relation over lotteries satisfies certain axioms,
then it can be represented by an expectational utility function, but it can
equally well be represented by many other utility functions which are not
expectational.7 However it is essential to Harsanyi’s theorem that only
vNM utility functions are used to represent preferences; without this,
7 If u is a vNM utility representation of a given preference relation R over lotteries, and f (u)
is any increasing transformation of u, affine or not, then f (u) will also represent R. On the
orthodox view, the reason for employing vNM utility functions, rather than any other, is
simply mathematical convenience; as Arrow (1951) said, their merit is ‘stating the laws of
rational behaviour in a particularly convenient way’ (p. 10).
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the utilitarian conclusion does not go through. But Harsanyi offers no
justification for only considering vNM utility functions; he appears to
think, wrongly, that their use is mandated rather than merely permitted
by the von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theorem.
Weymark concludes from this that for Harsanyi’s argument to
succeed, it must operate with a non-preference based concept of utility.
For example, utility could be construed as some kind of mental or hedonic
state, à la classical utilitarianism, whose relationship to preferences would
then be an empirical matter. (Indeed Harsanyi at times seems to have
such a concept in mind.) If such a notion of utility is granted, and
certain assumptions about it are made, then Harsanyi’s argument may
be salvageable. The assumptions are that utility is real-valued, cardinally
measurable, fully interpersonally comparable, and expectational, i.e. the
utility of a lottery is its expected utility.
This is the basis for a version of Harsanyi’s theorem proposed by
Weymark (1991) (his theorem 10). To avoid confusion Weymark talks
about well-being rather than utility, and makes the above assumptions
about well-being. As in Harsanyi’s original, there is a set of social
alternatives, and a set of lotteries over them. Each individual has a well-
being function over the lotteries. The impartial observer has a well-being
function over the extended alternatives, and the extended lotteries. The
‘principle of welfare identity’ says that the observer’s well-being from an
extended alternative in which she is person i for certain equals person i ’s
well-being in that alternative; this is the analogue of Harsanyi’s principle
of acceptance. Society’s well-being, in any simple lottery, is postulated to
equal the observer’s well-being in the corresponding impartial extended
lottery, analogously to Harsanyi’s original. Given all this, it is easily shown
that society’s well-being, in any social alternative, is the average well-
being of the individuals in society; so average utilitarianism is true.8
Weymark’s version of the theorem could be simplified, in that it is
not actually necessary to assume that individuals’ well-being functions
are defined on lotteries, as well as alternatives. (The same is not true of
the observer’s well-being function, obviously.) Even if individual well-
being is only defined for the social alternatives themselves, a utilitarian
conclusion can still be derived.9
8 The utilitarian conclusion follows very simply when utility or well-being is taken as
primitive in the impartial observer model. The fact that the observer’s well-being function
is expectational, and satisfies the principle of welfare identity, directly implies that the
well-being the observer derives from an impartial extended lottery equals the average
individual well-being in the corresponding simple lottery. As Mongin (2001) observes, this
is less a ‘theorem’ than a routine application of decision theory.
9 A utilitarian conclusion for the social alternatives themselves, that is. To derive a
utilitarian conclusion for the lotteries, as well as the alternatives, requires that the
individual well-being functions are defined over lotteries (and are expectational).
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Weymark argues that his version of the impartial observer theorem,
though free from the conceptual problems that plague Harsanyi’s original,
rests on assumptions that are hard to defend. That well-being is
cardinal and interpersonally comparable is controversial enough; but it
is the assumption that it is expectational that Weymark finds especially
problematic. Why should it be true that the well-being the observer gets
from a lottery equals the expected well-being derived from the prizes,
i.e. social alternatives? In the context of Harsanyi’s original argument this
question does not arise, since vNM utility is by definition expectational;
but the question is pressing for any non-preference based concept of
utility, or well-being.10
In section 5, I offer a biological interpretation of Harsanyi’s impartial
observer theorem, using Weymark’s version. It turns out that in a
biological setting, the assumptions about well-being or utility that are
needed to make the theorem work are readily defensible.
4. BIOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
To explain how the veil-of-ignorance concept applies to Mendelian
genetics, some biological preliminaries are necessary.
The vast majority of sexually reproducing species are diploid, meaning
that their cells contain two copies of each chromosome, one paternal and
one maternal. The two copies need not be genetically identical; each gene
has a number of variants, or alleles11, and the allele at a given slot on the
paternal chromosome may differ from the one at the corresponding slot
on the maternal chromosome. These chromosomal slots are known as loci.
If the two alleles at a given locus are the same, the organism is homozygotic
at that locus, otherwise it is heterozygotic. The genotype of an organism is
a specification of the alleles it contains at one or more loci. So if A and a
are two alleles at a given locus, there are three possible genotypes at that
locus: the homozygotes AA and aa, and the heterozygote Aa.
In order to reproduce sexually, diploid organisms produce gametes
(e.g. sperm or egg cells) which are haploid, i.e. contain only one of
each chromosome pair. Two haploid gametes then fuse to form a diploid
zygote, and a new organism is born. Gametes are formed via a cell-
division process called meiosis, which reduces the chromosome number
by half. So only one member of each chromosome pair ends up in a given
gamete.
Meiosis proceeds in a number of distinct stages; see Figure 1. Firstly,
every chromosome is copied, resulting in a cell that contains two copies
10 Risse (2002) and Broome (1991) have tried to argue, in a related context, that well-being is
‘inherently’ expectational, but it is debatable whether their argument succeeds.
11 In some contexts, biologists use the terms ‘gene’ and ‘allele’ more-or-less interchangeably,
a practice that is followed here where there is no risk of confusion.
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FIGURE 1. Crossing Over
of each maternal and each paternal chromosome. (In Figure 1, which
depicts meiosis for a single chromosome pair, this doubling has happened
before the diagram starts.) Next a process called ‘crossing over’ occurs, in
which the paternal and maternal chromosomes can swap portions of their
genetic material. The paternal and maternal chromosomes in each pair
line up alongside each other, break at the same point, exchange parts and
then join up. Finally, two rounds of cell division take place, resulting in
four haploid gametes each containing one of every chromosome pair. So
from a single diploid cell, four haploid gametes are ultimately produced.
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Crossing-over means that a chromosome in a gamete will usually
not be a perfect copy of either member of the chromosome pair from
which it came. This results in a ‘shuffling’ of genes between parent and
daughter chromosomes. If two genes are located at distant ends of a
parental chromosome, they may easily be broken up by crossing-over, so
will not tend to be transmitted together. But if the genes are located close
together on a chromosome, they are likely to be transmitted to a gamete
as a unit. Such genes, and the loci they occupy, are said to be ‘linked’.
Most of the time meiosis is fair, i.e. each member of a chromosome pair
has an equal chance of making it into any gamete. So an Aa heterozyote
will produce A gametes and a gametes in equal proportion (on average).
This is Mendel’s law of segregation, or Mendel’s first law. But the law
has exceptions. In many species, rogue genes have been discovered
which can cheat Mendel’s law and get into more than their fair share
of gametes. This is known as ‘meiotic drive’ or ‘segregation distortion’;
the genes in question are called segregation-distorters. If the A allele is a
segregation-distorter, then more than half of the gametes produced by the
Aa heretozygote will be Agametes.
Segregation-distorters only have evolutionary consequences when
they are in heterozygotes. Suppose there are two alleles Aand a at a locus,
and the A allele is able to distort segregation in its favour. This means
that the ratio of A to a gametes produced by an Aa heterozygote will
exceed 1:1, so the A allele will increase in frequency in the gene pool,
ceteris paribus. By contrast an AA homozygote only produces A gametes
anyway (mutation aside), so it makes no difference whether segregation
is Mendelian or not.
A segregation-distorter allele enjoys an inherent selective advantage
over non-distorters at the same locus. If the A allele distorts segregation
in its favour and there are no counterbalancing selective pressures, it will
sweep to fixation in the population. It is not known how often this has
happened in natural populations, since it is very difficult to detect. In
other cases the distorter allele does not become fixed, but is maintained
in the population at an intermediate frequency. This happens when the
distorter allele has negative effects on organismic fitness, which offsets its
segregation advantage. Thus suppose that the Aallele distorts segregation
in its favour, but that organisms with the AA genotype suffer a fitness
disadvantage compared to Aa and aa organisms. Then for a range of
parameter values, the population will evolve to a stable equilibrium in
which both alleles are present. When this happens, segregation-distorters
can be detected empirically.
Segregation distortion involves a special sort of natural selection,
known as ‘intra-genomic selection’, which takes place between the alleles
within a single organism. In the example above, the A allele is selected
over the a allele within Aa heterozygotes, since it gets into more than
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half the gametes. But this is countered by selection at a higher level, i.e.
selection between organisms. AA organisms are less fit than Aa and aa ,
so their total production of gametes is lower. Thus there are two opposing
selective forces at work, operating at different hierarchical levels. In effect,
the A allele in a heterozygote profits at the expense of its host organism –
it reduces the total number of gametes the organism produces, but takes a
disproportionate share of the pie for itself.
The above examples assume that a segregation-distorter is a gene at
a single locus. This is in principle possible, but empirically most cases of
segregation-distortion involve two genes at tightly linked loci, working
in concert (cf. Lyttle (1991)). In the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster, an
allele at the ‘toxin’ locus, denoted Sd, produces a product that inactivates
any gametes that do not produce antidote. Whether a gamete produces
antidote depends on which allele it has at a second locus; the Rsp+ allele
does not produce antidote, while the Rsp allele does. Since the two loci are
tightly linked, the Sd/Rsp pair constitutes an effective system for meiotic
drive. An Sd/Rsp chromosome will produce toxin that destroys gametes
not containing the Rsp allele; due to linkage, such gametes will not contain
the Sd allele either. So both the Sd and Rsp alleles will achieve greater
than fifty percent representation in the successful gametes of their host
organism, by destroying gametes containing rival alleles.
5. FAIR MENDELIAN SEGREGATION: EVOLUTIONARY
CONSIDERATIONS
Segregation distortion is the exception not the rule; most of the time
meiosis is fair. Since fair meiosis involves complex molecular machinery,
it seems probable that it is an evolved feature of organisms, so has a
Darwinian explanation. This prompts the question: what is the benefit of
fair meiosis? Why would natural selection have favoured it?
This question is deceptively simple; we need to ask: ‘benefit for
whom?’ An individual gene clearly benefits if it can distort segregation
in its favour – that way it will bequeath more copies to subsequent
generations. Imagine again two alleles at a locus, A and a . Clearly, the A
allele would prefer a segregation scheme of 4:1 in favour of A, for example,
over fair 1:1 segregation. Conversely, allele a would prefer segregation to
be biased in its favour. So neither allele at the locus in question benefits
from fair meiosis per se; both would do better if segregation were biased
to their advantage.
What about the organism as a whole? Does the whole organism
benefit from fair meiosis? The answer is ‘yes’, in many circumstances.
The reason is that a distorter will often have harmful effects on its host
organism. Ordinarily a gene which harms its host organism will harm its
own reproductive interests, so will be selected against. But this is not true
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if the gene is a segregation-distorter. A distorter gene may spread by natural
selection even if it harms its host organism – which implies a conflict of
interest between gene and organism.
To see this point, suppose allele a is initially fixed at a locus, and
then allele A arises by mutation. Allele A has two effects: it distorts
segregation in its favour, and it reduces the fitness of its host organism.
For concreteness, suppose the fitness scheme is: w(aa ) = 10, w(Aa ) = 9,
w(AA) = 8, where these are the numbers of successful gametes produced
by an organism of the genotype in question. Suppose that of the 9
successful gametes produced by an Aa heterozygote, 6 are A and 3 are
a , on average. Thus the Aa genotype produces fewer successful gametes
than the aa genotype, but a disproportionate number of these are A. So
despite imposing a fitness cost on its host organism, the mutant A allele
is favoured by natural selection when rare. The population evolves to a
stable equilibrium where both alleles are present.12
This illustrates how segregation distortion can lead to a conflict of
interest between a gene and its host organism. Of course a distorter might
not harm its host organism; it could be phenotypically neutral, or even
beneficial. In these cases the distorter will quickly sweep to fixation in the
population, since its segregation advantage is not offset by any negative
effects on organismic fitness. But when distorters are maintained in the
population in a polymorphic equilibrium, as empirically is often found,
then they must be harming their hosts.
The conflict of interest between a distorter allele and its host organism
can equally be thought of as a conflict between the distorter allele and the
genes at other (unlinked13) loci within the organism. If allele A distorts
segregation at its own locus, a gene at an unlinked locus is not directly
affected. However if the A allele also reduces organismic fitness, as many
distorters do, then genes at other loci suffer. They pay the cost of the
reduction in fitness but gain no compensating segregation advantage, so
end up bequeathing fewer copies to the next generation. Genes at other
loci thus benefit if they can somehow prevent the A allele from distorting
segregation, so will be under selection to do so.
This is the basis for the explanation of fair meiosis developed by
Eshel (1985), who showed that ‘modifier’ genes at unlinked loci, that have
the effect of restoring fair meiosis at the locus undergoing drive, will be
12 Presuming mating is random, equilibrium is attained when the population-wide
frequencies of the Aand a alleles are approximately 0.45 and 0.55 respectively. With these
frequencies, the marginal fitnesses of the A and a alleles are equal so there is no further
evolutionary change.
13 The qualification ‘unlinked’ is crucial. At any linked locus, there will be selection for
genes which increase allele A’s segregation distortion, as they will become preferentially
associated with A and will thus gain from the distortion.
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favoured by natural selection.14 So a tug-of-war will ensue: the A allele
will try to bias segregation in its favour, but alleles at all other unlinked
loci in the genome will try to restore meiotic fairness. Since there are many
such loci in the genome, they are likely to win the war. The predicted
outcome is thus a restoration of fair meiosis. Thus there is a putative
evolutionary explanation for why fair meiosis is the rule. This explanation
is widely accepted among biologists.
The underlying idea in Eshel’s explanation was vividly expressed
by Leigh (1977), who spoke of a ‘parliament of genes’ trying to prevent
‘cabals of a few conspiring for their own “selfish profit” at the expense
of the “commonwealth”’ (p. 4543). Leigh’s point was that the bulk of the
genes in the genome gain nothing from one of their member distorting
segregation at its own locus, and potentially stand to lose a lot, given
that distorters often reduce organismic fitness; therefore the genes have
a collective interest in enforcing fair meiotic division.
A different (though equivalent) perspective is that fair meiosis acts
to equalize the interests of all the genes in the organism. If meiosis is
constrained to be fair, then the only way a gene can benefit itself is to boost
the fitness (total gametic output) of the whole organism, which benefits
all other genes too. By contrast, if a gene can break Mendel’s law then it
can benefit despite harming its host organism, as we have seen. So fair
meiosis acts as a unifying force, preventing internal conflict and leading
the organism to behave as a single, cohesive entity.
The fact of meiotic drive, and the evolutionary pressures it gives rise
to, remind us that the unity of the individual organism cannot be taken for
granted. We naturally regard an individual organism as a cohesive entity,
with a unity of purpose, i.e. all its parts work for the common good. This
is often justified, but organismic unity is an evolutionary achievement,
and is possible only to the extent that meiotic drive (and other forms of
intra-genomic conflict) are kept in check (cf. Ridley 2000). An organism in
a sexual species is a temporary coalition of genes whose interests do not
necessarily overlap, as they are not all transmitted together. Fair meiosis
works to align the genes’ interests, ensuring they work for the common
good. If the parliament of genes could not enforce Mendel’s law, harmful
genes could spread and organismic integrity would be undermined.
How exactly is fair meiosis enforced? The biochemical details are
not well understood, but Haig and Grafen (1991) suggest one possible
mechanism. Recall that empirically, most cases of segregation distortion
involve a pair of genes at tightly linked loci acting in concert – such as
the toxin/antidote Sd/Rsp system in Drosophila described above. Given
this fact, any way of ‘unlinking’ the two loci, e.g. by increasing the rate
14 A modifier gene is one which affects the phenotypic expression of some other gene in an
organism.
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of crossing over, will tend to restore fair meiosis. The Sd/Rsp system relies
critically on the fact that a gamete containing the Sd allele is also likely
to contain Rsp, and thus to be immune from the toxin. But if the linkage
is broken, then the Sd’s segregation advantage disappears – for then, the
toxin it produces will be as likely to kill a gamete containing a copy of
itself as of its rival allele. Destroying linkage thus prevents genes like
Sd and Rsp from forming a selfish cabal at the expense of the rest of
the genome. Thus one way to prevent meiotic drive, Haig and Grafen
argue, is to destroy linkage, i.e. to force the genes in question to assort
independently. Genes on other chromosomes that can achieve this result
will be selectively favoured.
More could be said about the evolution of fair meiosis, but the
essential points have been made.15 In a sexual species, there is a potential
conflict between any individual gene and its host organism. A gene that
distorts segregation in its favour can spread despite reducing its host’s
fitness. This harms genes at unlinked loci, who are thus under selection to
restore fair meiosis if they can. One effect of fair meiosis is to equalize the
interests of all the genes, thus ensuring they work for the common good.
One way of achieving this is to destroy linkage, given that segregation
distortion typically involves linked genes working in concert.
6. MENDELIAN SEGREGATION AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
Finally we are in a position to relate Mendelian genetics to the veil of
ignorance. The basis for the analogy is fairly clear. When meiosis is fair,
then any given allele does not ‘know’ whether it will be transmitted to
a particular gamete – the chance that it will is fifty percent. So the allele
is behind a veil of ignorance with regard to its presence in each gamete,
which ensures that its interests are aligned with its host organism, i.e. it
will seek to maximize the organism’s gametic output. Furthermore, an
allele that is transmitted to a gamete does not ‘know’ which other alleles
(at unlinked loci) are also in the gamete. By forcing genes behind a veil of
ignorance, fair meiosis thus randomizes away the information that alleles
would need to profit at the expense of their host, or to form selfish cabals
with genes at other loci.
This analogy may seem limited since it says nothing about choice
from behind the veil, a notion central to the Harsanyi/Rawls argument.
But in fact the notion of choice (or preference) is implicit in talk of
a gene’s ‘interests’ – which is itself short-hand for talking about what
natural selection would favour. This permits the analogy to be elaborated
as follows. The alleles in an organism correspond to the individuals
15 Crow (1991) is a useful review of work on this topic up to 1991; Úbeda and Haig (2005)
discuss some recent developments.
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in society, in Harsanyi’s model. The social alternatives are alternative
‘gametic outputs’, i.e. specifications of how many successful gametes
the organism leaves and which alleles they contain. Each allele has
a ‘preference order’ over the alternatives, determined by how many
copies of itself are left in each alternative. The organism itself also
has a preference order over the alternatives (analogous to the social
preference in Harsanyi’s model), determined by the total gametic output,
or organismic fitness, in each alternative.
To illustrate, consider a single locus with two alleles Aand a . Suppose
that for an Aa heterozygote, there are four biologically possible output
levels – leaving 0, 1, 2 or 3 successful gametes. All segregation schemes
are considered possible. Thus the set of social alternatives S is: {0, A, a ,
AA, Aa , a A, aa , AAA, AAa , Aa A, Aaa , a AA, a Aa , aa A, aaa } where ‘ AAa ’,
for example, means that the organism leaves three successful gametes,
the first two of which contain A and the third a . (Note that the order in
which the gametes are produced matters, so AAa and Aa A are different
alternatives.) The A allele prefers alternative x to y iff it leaves more
copies in x than y; thus the A allele prefers alternative AAa to aaa , for
example. The a allele has the converse preference. The organism itself is
indifferent between AAa and aaa , since its fitness is the same in each (see
Table 1).
All alleles at unlinked loci (not modelled here) have the same
preference order as the organism; they have no interest per se in whether
meiosis is fair at the A/a locus.16 Note also that the A allele prefers Aa to
aaa , despite total gametic output being greater in the latter. This illustrates
the fact that the A allele, if permitted to choose, could easily harm the
interests of the whole organism.
It bears emphasis that talk of ‘interests’, ‘choice’ and ‘preference’ in
this and other evolutionary contexts is fully legitimate, as it can be cashed
out precisely and non-metaphorically in terms of natural selection. In
saying that the A allele ‘prefers’ alternative Aa to aaa , we mean that if
the A allele could exert causal influence over which of these alternatives
obtained, natural selection would lead it to bring about the Aa alternative.
Similarly, in saying that the organism is indifferent between AAa and aaa
we mean that selection would have no tendency to favour an organism
producing one rather than the other of these gametic outputs. A related
point is that the ‘preference order’ of each allele (and the organism) is
not primitive, but rather derives from its fitness in each alternative. It
is because allele A has a fitness of two in alternative AAa and a fitness
16 Note that this does not conflict with the standard argument, expounded in section 5, that
selection at the organism level (or at unlinked loci) will tend to restore fair meiosis. That
argument presumes that the segregation-distorter alleles will have a negative effect on

































Rank A’s preference a’s preference Organism’s preference
1. AAA aaa AAA, AAa , Aa A, a AA, Aaa , a Aa , aa A, aaa
2. AA, AAa , Aa A, a AA aa , Aaa , a Aa , aa A AA, Aa , a A, aa
3. A, Aa , a A, Aaa , a Aa , aa A a , Aa , a A, AAa , Aa A, a AA A, a
4. aaa , aa , a , 0 AAA, AA, A, 0 0
TABLE 1. Preference orders over gametic outputs
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of zero in alternative aaa that it prefers the former to the latter. So the
preference ordering is induced by the fitness function. This is the converse
of the usual situation in decision theory, where preferences are primitive
and their numerical representations derived. The significance of this will
become clear.
Since the A and a alleles have different preference orders over the
social alternatives, and the organism itself has a different preference order
again, there is considerable scope for internal conflict – selection will tend
to disrupt the integrity of the organism. It is here that fair meiosis comes
into play; as we have seen, it has the effect of aligning the interests of all
parties.
To represent this in the Harsanyi framework, we first need to
introduce lotteries over the set S, i.e. probability distributions over
possible gametic outputs. This permits two types of randomness or
uncertainty to be modelled: about how many successful gametes the
organism produces, and about which genes they contain. The former
arises because survival and reproduction are stochastic – two organisms
of identical genotype won’t necessarily enjoy the same reproductive
success. Though important in many evolutionary models, this factor is
not especially relevant here. The latter arises because of the meiotic
process, and is our prime concern. Suppose that meiosis is fair, and that
the organism definitely leaves two successful gametes (so there is no
uncertainty of the first type.) This picks out a unique lottery over S, which
has P(AA) = P(Aa ) = P(a A) = P(aa ) = 14 and zero probability for every
other alternative. This is because with fair meiosis, any gamete has an
equal chance of receiving the A or a allele, with independence across
gametes. Clearly, any given alternative to fair meiosis, e.g. 3:1 in favour
of A, also picks out a unique lottery, once the total number of successful
gametes has been specified.
What about preference over lotteries? How do we make sense of
the idea that allele A prefers one lottery to another? The natural way is
to assume that an allele evaluates lotteries by the criterion of expected
fitness, and so would prefer, i.e. be selected to bring about, the lottery in
which its expected fitness is highest; similarly for the organism. Thus allele
A’s evaluation of the lottery described above, in which two successful




















Modulo this assumption, it is straightforward to derive a preference order
for each allele, and for the organism, over the entire lottery set.
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Importantly, there is a real biological rationale for assuming that
lotteries are evaluated by expected fitness, namely that this is the
evaluation that natural selection will make. When the fitness of an
organism (or genotype) is a random quantity, it is well-known that natural
selection will select for maximization of expected fitness, given two
conditions. These are: (i) that the population is very large, and (ii) the
randomness is independent across organisms. Condition (i) is standard
in evolutionary theory. To understand condition (ii), suppose an organism
of a given genotype leaves 1 or 3 offspring with equi-probability. If each
organism of the genotype faces an independent 50:50 gamble on 1 or 3
offspring, e.g. a separate coin is flipped for each, then condition (ii) is
satisfied. But if the risk is correlated, e.g. a single coin flip decides whether
all organisms of the genotype leave 1 or all leave 3, then condition (ii) is
violated.17
In some contexts, assuming independence across organisms (or
‘uncorrelated risk’) would be unjustified. For example, if an organism’s
fitness varies randomly because of the weather, the independence
assumption would clearly be wrong, since the weather affects many
organisms. But in the present context, where our interest is the
random variation in an organism’s gametic output due to meiosis,
the assumption is fully justified. Suppose again that an organism of
genotype Aa definitely leaves two successful gametes and that meiosis
is fair, so P(AA) = P(Aa ) = P(a A) = P(aa ) = 14 . Clearly, this probability
distribution is independent across all Aa organisms, given how meiosis
works. Knowing that one Aa organism produced AA, for example, tells
us nothing about the output of any other. More precisely, if we consider
lotteries in which total gametic output is certain, so the uncertainty
pertains only to the distribution of the output, then the independence
assumption is justified. Expected fitness is thus the right criterion by
which an allele, or an organism, should evaluate such lotteries.
We can now use our Harsanyi-style framework to give precise
expression to the idea that fair meiosis equalizes the interests of the Aand
a alleles, thus preventing conflict. The two alleles have different preference
orders over the set S, and thus also over the lottery set S, as we have
seen. But consider the subset of lotteries that are meiotically fair, i.e. which
are compatible with each allele having an equal chance of entering any
gamete. The Aand a alleles will evaluate the meiotically fair lotteries identically,
and thus have identical preference orderings over them. To see this, consider
again the lottery in which meiosis is fair, and the organism definitely
leaves two successful gametes, i.e. < P(AA) = P(Aa ) = P(a A) = P(aa ) =
1
4 >. The Aallele’s evaluation of this is
1
4 (2) + 14 (1) + 14 (1) + 14 (0) = 1, which
17 These two extremes – independence across gametes and perfect correlation – are the
opposite ends of a spectrum. Intermediate degrees of correlation are also possible.
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is the same as the a allele’s evaluation. The same will be true of any
meiotically fair lottery.
Note also that the Aand a allele’s preference ordering over the subset
of meiotically fair lotteries will coincide with that of the organism – so lotteries
will be ranked according to average (or total) gametic output, i.e. in a
‘utilitarian’ way. To illustrate, compare the meiotically fair lotteries in
which the organism definitely leaves one and two successful gametes
respectively, i.e. < P(A) = P(a ) = 12 > and < P(AA) = P(Aa ) = P(a A) =
P(aa ) = 14 >. The organism obviously prefers the latter, as its fitness is
twice as high as in the former. Each allele’s expected fitness is also twice
as high in the latter lottery, so its interests are aligned perfectly with the
organism’s. Therefore if meiosis is constrained to be fair, the only way that
an allele can boost its expected representation in the next generation is by
boosting the organism’s total gametic output.
This shows that two standard pieces of biological wisdom about
fair meiosis are neatly captured by casting the issue in a Harsanyi-style
framework. That fair meiosis aligns the interests of competing alleles, with
each other and with the host organism, is reflected in the fact that their
preference orders coincide over the subset of lotteries that are meiotically
fair. The device of fair meiosis, therefore, is the organism’s solution to the
social contract problem.
This is interesting, and vindicates the idea of treating the alleles in an
organism as individuals in a society, with potentially divergent interests.
But it does not quite forge a logical link with Harsanyi’s own argument.
Recall that Harsanyi uses the device of a hypothetical impartial observer
to construct a social ordering of all lotteries (and thus alternatives) – which
turns out to be the utilitarian ordering. We have represented fair meiosis,
however, as effecting a restriction on the set of lotteries to the ‘meiotically
fair’ ones; on this subset, each allele’s ordering is the utilitarian ordering.
There is a similarity here to Harsanyi’s argument, but not a exact
parallel. Indicative of this is that the notion of an extended lottery,
central to Harsanyi’s argument, played no role in our representation of
fair meiosis. Is it possible to forge a more direct link? It turns out that
it is.
7. AN EXPLICIT LINK BETWEEN FAIR MEIOSIS
AND THE IMPARTIAL OBSERVER THEOREM
Harsanyi introduces extended lotteries in order to model the notion of
impartiality, or justice. He needs to do this since his social alternatives
are purely abstract. But in our biological application the alternatives
have internal structure – an alternative specifies how many resources
(gametes) go to each individual. This permits the notion of impartiality
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to be modelled more simply, without the need for extended lotteries, via
symmetry considerations.
Call a lottery over gametic outputs symmetric if it is invariant
under permutation of alleles. Thus for example, the lottery < P(AAA) =
P(aaa ) = 12 > is symmetric, since if every ‘A’ is swapped to an ‘a ’ we end
up with exactly the same lottery. Note that if a lottery is symmetric, the
expected number of A and a alleles it yields is the same, so the two alleles
will evaluate it identically.
From an individual allele’s point of view, symmetry has an obvious
epistemic interpretation. Symmetric lotteries are ones in which the allele is
deprived of knowledge about its own identity. For the A allele, the lottery
< P(AAA) = P(aaa ) = 12 > corresponds to certain knowledge that its host
organism will produce three identical successful gametes, but ignorance
about who it will be – the lucky or the unlucky one. This interpretation
suggests a natural link with Harsanyi’s notion of an impartial extended
lottery.
Note that all meiotically fair lotteries are symmetric though not vice-
versa. Meiotically fair lotteries are ones in which each allele has a given
chance of entering any gamete, with independence across gametes. So the
lottery < P(AAA) = P(aaa ) = 12 > is not meiotically fair, since although
each allele has an equal chance of being found in (for example) the second
successful gamete, independence across gametes is not satisfied – the
allele found in the second successful gamete will definitely be found in
the first and third. So in meiotically fair lotteries, each allele is deprived
of knowledge of its own identity, and also of conditional knowledge of its
own identity given any information about the organism’s gametic output.
So we have: meiotically fair lotteries ⊂ symmetric lotteries ⊂ all lotteries.
To each alternative in S, there is exactly one meiotically fair lottery
which gives that alternative non-zero probability, and which definitely
yields the same total number of gametes as that alternative. Call this
the meiotically fair lottery that corresponds to the alternative. Thus to
the alternative Aa , for example, there corresponds the meiotically fair
lottery < P(AA) = P(Aa ) = P(a A) = P(aa ) = 14 >; note that this lottery
also corresponds to alternatives AA, a A and aa . More generally, the set
S can be partitioned into equivalence classes of alternatives with the
same corresponding meiotically fair lotteries. These can be regarded as
‘information sets’, i.e. alternatives which neither allele can tell apart,
under the supposition that meiosis will be fair.
We can then derive an evaluation, and thus an ordering, of the
alternatives in S for a given allele ‘from behind the meiotic veil’.
Ordinarily, the A allele evaluates an alternative by how many copies it
leaves in that alternative. But with fair meiosis in place, the allele can’t
discriminate between alternatives in the same information set; and thus
is forced to substitute their evaluation of the corresponding meiotically
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FIGURE 2. Two ways of representing impartiality
fair lottery. Thus the A allele’s ‘veiled’ evaluation of alternative Aa ,
for example, equals their evaluation of the lottery < P(AA) = P(Aa ) =
P(a A) = P(aa ) = 14 >, which equals 1; allele a ’s ‘veiled’ evaluation is the
same. This evaluation then induces a veiled ordering of the alternatives,
from best to worst.
Now recall Harsanyi’s approach. To each alternative Harsanyi
associates a unique impartial extended lottery. Let us apply this to our
genetic example, where the alternatives are gametic outputs. Thus for
example, Harsanyi’s procedure associates to alternative Aa the lottery <
P(Aa , A) = P(Aa , a ) = 12 >; this can be read ‘alternative Aa for certain,
with equal probability of being person A or person a ’. Harsanyi then
derives a social ordering of the alternatives, by postulating that it equals
the observer’s ordering of the corresponding impartial extended lotteries.
An explicit link between the two ways of modelling impartiality is
now possible. For each alternative in S, there corresponds to it a unique
impartial extended lottery, and a unique meiotically fair lottery (Figure 2).
We can then order the alternatives in S two ways: by how the observer
would order the corresponding impartial extended lotteries, or by how
one of the alleles would order the corresponding meiotically fair lotteries.
But these two give exactly the same result – the average utilitarian ordering. To
see this, compare the two alternatives Aa and aa . The impartial observer,
to evaluate these, would compare the lotteries < P(Aa , A) = P(Aa , a ) = 12
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>, and < P(aa , A) = P(aa , a ) = 12 >. Assuming the principle of welfare
identity, and that the observer’s valuation function is expectational, the
former is evaluated as 12 (1) + 12 (1) = 1, the latter as 12 (0) + 12 (2) = 1. So the
observer deems the alternatives equally good. Now consider how the A
allele (or the a allele) would evaluate Aa and aa from behind the meiotic
veil. Since both alternatives are in the same information set, the A allele
would evaluate them both as 14 (2) + 14 (1) + 14 (1) + 14 (0) = 1. So both ways
of ordering yield the result that Aa and aa are as good as each other. This
result generalizes easily, yielding:
Proposition 1: Let S be the set of alternative gametic outputs. Let
R be the ordering of S given by the impartial observer’s ordering of
the corresponding impartial alternative lotteries (assuming the principle
of welfare identity, and that the observer’s valuation function is
expectational). Let R′ be the ordering of S given by any allele’s ordering
of the corresponding meiotically fair lottery. Then, R = R′.
Proof: see Appendix
Proposition 1 shows that the link between Harsanyi’s way of modelling
social justice, via the device of an impartial observer, and the natural way
of modelling genomic justice, via a restriction on the set of lotteries to the
meiotically fair ones, is actually quite intimate. In reality, the two amount
to the same thing: they capture the notion of impartiality in different,
but equivalent, ways. The main difference is the greater generality of
Harsanyi’s approach, since it does not require that the social alternatives
have structure.
A second, minor difference is that Harsanyi’s way of deriving a social
ordering of the alternatives derives from a more general ordering of
the lotteries; while the ‘meiotically fair’ lottery approach yields a direct
ordering of the alternatives. But this difference is more real than apparent.
On the meiotically fair approach, it would be straightforward to extend
the ‘social’ ordering to the full lottery set S, if we wished, simply by
stipulating that a lottery’s valuation is its expected valuation.
Importantly, proposition 1 could be strengthened by considering
symmetric lotteries rather than meiotically fair lotteries. To each
alternative in S, there corresponds a set of symmetric lotteries each
of which definitely yields the same total number of gametes as that
alternative, but only one of which is meiotically fair. However, an allele
will evaluate all of these symmetric lotteries identically, by the average
utilitarian rule. Therefore, proposition 1 would be true if for ‘meiotically
fair’ lottery we substituted any member of the class of symmetric lotteries
that correspond to the alternative in question. That is, restricting the
permissible lotteries to the meiotically fair ones is a way, but not the
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only way, of forcing alleles to substitute the organism’s interest for their
own.
This last observation raises an important question. We have been
assuming, with biological orthodoxy, that the function of fair meiosis is
to unify the interests of the genes in an organism. But fair meiosis, which
amounts to flipping a separate fair coin for each gamete that is produced,
is not the only way to achieve this task. Instead, an Aa heterozygote could
flip one coin for all the gametes to be produced, i.e. they all get allele
A or all get allele a , with equal probability. If two successful gametes
are definitely produced, the resulting lottery is < P(AA) = P(aa ) = 12 >
– which is symmetric though not meiotically fair. A veil of ignorance of
this type would also lead alleles to evaluate lotteries by average gametic
output. Why did evolution not solve the problem of conflicting interests
this way?
I do not know the answer to this question. It may be that using
a separate coin flip for each gamete is the simplest way to implement
symmetry, or there may be an underlying evolutionary reason why the
allocation of genes to gametes should be independent across gametes, i.e.
some adaptive advantage to this independence. Whatever the answer, this
question highlights the fact that not all aspects of diploid genetics can be
accounted for by the parallel between Harsanyi’s veil of ignorance and
its Mendelian counterpart. This is not really surprising; if anything it is
surprising that the parallel extends as far as it does.
What exactly is the upshot of proposition 1? It shows, in a precise
manner, that the way fair meiosis leads alleles to align their interest with
the whole organism is identical to the way that the veil of ignorance leads
Harsanyi’s impartial observer to align her interests with those of society
as a whole – where the latter are defined by the average utilitarian rule.
Of course the veil of ignorance is a mere thought experiment for Harsanyi
and Rawls, so it is remarkable that the underlying principle behind it –
that randomization can serve to align the interests of competing agents
– finds an embodiment in real biological systems. Note also that the
biological instantiation of the principle corresponds better to Harsanyi’s
than to Rawls’s version of the argument, in that the former’s utilitarian
conclusion clearly holds in the biological case. From behind the meiotic
veil, an allele will use the average utilitarian rule to evaluate alternatives,
given standard biological assumptions.
In a sense, our biological version of the impartial observer theorem
is actually superior to Harsanyi’s original. Recall the Sen/Weymark
challenge to Harsanyi: to justify properly his assumption that utility
(well-being) is both expectational and inter-personally comparable. This
challenge is straightforward to meet in the biological case, where utility
is replaced by fitness, and the genes in the organism are the individuals
in society. Fitness is trivially (fully) comparable across genes (and
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organisms); indeed the whole point of the fitness concept is to permit
comparisons between biological units (genes, genotypes and organisms).
A gene’s fitness, as understood here, is simply the number of copies left
in the next generation, and an organism’s fitness means its total gametic
contribution to the next generation. So inter-personal comparability is
unproblematic in the biological case.
Moreover, the assumption that the valuation function is expectational,
which is crucial to Harsanyi’s theorem, has a real biological rationale, as
noted earlier. For when risk is uncorrelated, the ‘right’ way for a gene
(or an organism) to evaluate a lottery is to use the expected value of that
lottery – in that this is the evaluation that matters to natural selection.
With uncorrelated risk, a gene which codes for lottery L1 will be selected
over one which codes for L2 if and only if the expected number of copies
it leaves in L1 is greater than in L2. So the ‘expectational’ nature of the
valuation function, for which Harsanyi offered no good argument, admits
of a genuine rationale in our biological application of the theorem.
There is a certain irony in this. At first blush, the idea of applying
Harsanyi’s theorem to Mendelian genetics may seem implausible, a rather
strained analogy. But closer examination reveals that the connection
is quite intimate – the principle that Harsanyi discovered really is
instantiated in genetic systems. Moreover in the genetic case, the
Sen/Weymark criticism cuts no ice. Sen and Weymark were no doubt
right that Harsanyi’s theorem does not amount to a ‘proof’ of classical
utilitarianism, but Harsanyi’s underlying point – that the veil of ignorance
leads to a utilitarian evaluation rule given certain assumptions – was
of course correct. The problem was that the assumptions in question
were ones that Harsanyi could not justify. But in the biological case
the corresponding assumptions can be justified, and the analogue of
utilitarianism – that organisms, and their constituent genes, should try
to maximize total gametic output – actually holds true.
8. COMPARISON WITH RIDLEY’S ANALYSIS
In his book Mendel’s Demon, the biologist Mark Ridley (2000) provides an
extended discussion of how the veil-of-ignorance concept applies to ge-
netics. My analysis differs from Ridley’s in two main ways. Firstly, Ridley
focuses exclusively on Rawls’s rather than Harsanyi’s version of the veil-
of-ignorance argument. However Harsanyi’s version is more relevant for
the parallel with genetics, both because it is formally elaborated, which
allows the parallel to be made precise, and because his decision-theoretic
assumptions make good sense in a biological context. Indicative of this
is that Harsanyi’s utilitarian conclusion holds true in biological systems
with fair meiosis, while Rawls’s maximin conclusion does not.
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Secondly, Ridley’s view of how the veil-of-ignorance concept applies
to genetics is different from our own. Recall from section 4 that two
sorts of randomization occur in genetics. Firstly, one of each chromosome
pair is allocated at random to a gamete, when meiosis is fair. Secondly,
crossing over breaks up linkage, which means that whether an allele at
one chromosomal locus gets in to a particular gamete is independent of
whether an allele at another locus does. As a result, selfish cabals that
subvert the group’s interests cannot form. This helps keep meiosis fair,
given that empirically, successful distortion of segregation requires genes
at two loci to work in concert (as in the Sd/Rsp system in Drosophila
melanogaster ). So the second sort of randomization helps stabilize the
first.
In our analysis, it is the first sort of randomization that occupies
centre-stage, for it is here that the link with the Harsanyi/Rawls argument
is strongest. Just as the veil of ignorance leads Harsanyi’s impartial
observer to choose the option that maximizes society’s total welfare, so
the Mendelian veil of ignorance (i.e. fair meiosis) leads genes to choose
the option that maximizes their organism’s total gametic output, thus
equalizing their individual interests with that of the collective.
However, Ridley’s emphasis is on the second sort of randomization,
i.e. the genetic recombination caused by crossing over. It is here that he
thinks the analogy with Rawls’s argument works best (p. 200). But this
seems questionable. The main effect of recombination is to deprive genes
of information about the identity of genes at other loci, which prevents
selfish cabals forming, as Ridley emphasizes. This is an important point,
but it has no clear counterpart in the Rawls/Harsanyi argument. The
latter involves a single individual – the impartial observer – uncertain
about which member of society he will become. The uncertainty does
not concern the characteristics of other members of society – or at least,
any such uncertainty is strictly irrelevant to the decision problem that the
impartial observer faces. So the second sort of randomization, at least in
so far as its cabal-stopping consequences are what matters, has no parallel
in the Harsanyi/Rawls story.18
My disagreement with Ridley over how the veil-of-ignorance concept
applies to genetics is related to the difference between proximate and
ultimate explanations. Ridley emphasizes that recombination prevents
18 To be fair to Ridley, he also discusses another consequence of crossing over, to which
this criticism does not apply. Following Haig and Grafen (1991), he argues that meoisis
is designed to prevent the spread of ‘sister killer’ genes, which gain a transmission
advantage by causing their host gamete to kill its sister gamete after meiotic cell division.
Crossing over frustrates such sister killer genes, as it means that a putative sister killer
doesn’t ‘know’ whether a copy of itself will be found in the sister gamete or not, so is just
as likely to harm as to help itself. This consequence of crossing over is distinct from its
cabal-stopping consequences. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this observation.
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selfish cabals forming, and thus deprives genes of the information they
would need to cheat Mendel’s first law. This helps keep meiosis fair,
given empirical facts about how systems of segregation-distortion actually
work. So the second sort of randomization is part of the proximate
mechanism by which fair meiosis is maintained. But this says nothing
about why fair meiosis is adaptively advantageous in the first place. The
first sort of randomization, by contrast, addresses this ultimate question.
By equalizing the chances that each allele at a locus will enter a given
gamete, the interests of genes are aligned, with each other and with the
whole organism. Selection at the organism level will therefore tend to
produce fair meiosis.
The contrast between the two types of randomization, therefore, is
in part a contrast between a particular mechanism by which fair meiosis
is in fact stabilized, and the evolutionary consequences that follow from
meiosis being fair, however this fairness is achieved. It makes sense
that a biological version of the Harsanyi/Rawls argument should have
an ultimate orientation. For the Harsanyi/Rawls argument involves the
notion of utility, or welfare, applied to both individuals and whole
societies. The biological analogue is the notion of fitness, which also
applies to both individual genes and whole organisms. But the notion
of fitness is the paradigmatically ultimate notion; questions of fitness
concern evolutionary consequences, not proximate mechanisms.
Despite these criticisms, Ridley’s treatment is insightful and provided
the inspiration for the foregoing analysis. Ridley concludes his discussion
by saying that ‘Rawls’s mechanism in a way applies more powerfully to
genes than it does to human beings’ (p. 200). If ‘Rawls’ is replaced with
‘Harsanyi’, then I think this conclusion is exactly right. As we have seen,
the impartial observer argument as applied to humans is in fact fraught
with difficulty. The assumptions that Harsanyi uses in his theorem are
difficult to justify in the rational choice context that he was operating in. In
the biological context, by contrast, the assumptions are straightforward to
justify, and the utilitarian conclusion actually holds true. Individual genes
do in fact act to maximize their organism’s gametic output, as a result of
the fairness of meiosis, so they behave like utilitarian agents.
9. CONCLUSION
This paper has explored a parallel between the veil-of-ignorance concept
in social ethics and in evolutionary genetics. I have argued that the
parallel is a genuine one that runs deep and has real explanatory power.
In particular, there is an intriguing biological analogue of Harsanyi’s
impartial observer argument that is free from the difficulties that plague
Harsanyi’s original. The principle that Harsanyi discovered is actually
instantiated in the genetic systems of sexually reproducing organisms,
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and ensures that their constituent genes work for the good of the whole
organism.
The parallel I have developed derives from the fact that utility and
fitness play isomorphic roles in rational choice theory and evolutionary
theory respectively. This role-isomorphism has been noted before by many
authors, particularly in relation to decision-making in strategic contexts,
but has only rarely been applied in relation to social choice.19 However
there is no good reason for this, since the basic premise of social choice –
the existence of individuals in a society with divergent interests – is
directly applicable to many biological systems. Future work will be
needed to tell whether this conceptual link can be fruitfully exploited.
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A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
S is the set of alternative gametic outputs. So each x ∈ S is a finite sequence of
As and as, e.g. Aa Aaa AAa . Let Nx be the total number of gametes produced in
alternative x. Let Ax be the total number of A gametes produced in alternative x.
Let x′ be the impartial extended lottery that corresponds to x. So x′ ≡ < P(x, A) =
P(x, a ) = 12 >. Let x′′ be the meiotically fair lottery that corresponds to x. Let Vo
be the impartial observer’s valuation function. Let VA be the A allele’s valuation
function. Let Va be the a allele’s valuation function. We wish to show that Vo(x′) =
VA(x′′).
Consider the impartial extended lottery x′ ≡ < P(x, A) = P(x, a ) = 12 >. By
the principle of welfare identity, and the fact that Vo(x′) is expectational, we have:
Vo(x′) = 12 VA(x) + 12 Va (x). But VA(x) = Ax and Va (x) = Nx − Ax . Therefore Vo(x′) =
1
2 Nx .
Next, consider the meiotically fair lottery x′′. x′′ is an equiprobable lottery over
2 Nx alternatives in S. In each of these alternatives, the number of A alleles ranges










) = 12 Nx . Therefore Vo(x′) = VA(x′′) = 12 Nx .
That is, for any alternative x ∈ S, the impartial observer’s valuation of the
corresponding impartial extended lottery x′ equals the A allele’s valuation of the
corresponding meiotically fair lottery x′′.
QED
